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The Directive on the Credit Agreements for Consumers relating to Residential 
Immovable Property (Directive 2014/17): a Regulatory Explanation and a Private Law 
Analysis. 
 
Abstract 
With the devastation wrought by the 2008 ‘property market bubble’ still fresh in the mind on one hand, and a spate of 
recent enthusiasm manifested in the ‘rush to the property ladder’ on the other, the newly enacted Directive 2014/17 seeks 
to strike a middle ground of reasonableness in the delicate and sensitive matter of the security granted by the buyer of a 
residential property. 
Against this background, the present contribution analyses, first and foremost, the norms of a regulatory nature introduced 
by the new EU piece of legislation and the attempt to shape a new category of consumer. Among these precepts, attention 
is particularly afforded to the principle, of a public nature, prescribing that the bank’s assessment to grant a mortgage 
shall be prevailingly based on the ability of the mortgagor to repay the debt, rather than on the expected (but 
undemonstrated) burgeoning future value of the property. 
Furthermore, the discussion focuses on the private law principles introduced by the Directive. Among these is the onus 
lying on the bank to provide adequate information about the terms and conditions of the mortgage. More interestingly, 
the directive at stake derogates from, and goes beyond, the notion of prohibition of ‘agreement of forfeiture’ existing in 
some civil law jurisdictions. This novelty, the ancillary legal provisions of art 28 of Directive 2014/17 as well as their 
impact on the system of civil proceedings and foreclosure existing in each country, provide fertile ground for a legal and 
comparative analysis. 
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1. Introduction  
The financial sector has proved a particularly harsh domain over much of the 
past decade. Prior to 2007, many property buyers had availed of readily 
accessible loans, nonchalantly granted by credit institutions, on the widely-held 
assumption that the underlying good (the property) would perpetually rise in 
value. In reality, from 2008 the property market veered significantly in the 
opposite direction, with falling prices pushing buyers inexorably towards a 
‘negative equity’1. However, this downward spiral has since been arrested and 
an upward curve re-established as the value of the properties has more recently 
started climbing again, in some countries to levels which even surpass those 
recorded in the pre-crisis era.2 This may indicate that the common theories 
surrounding the property market, disseminated with confidence prior to 2008 
(ergo, the property market as a relentlessly thriving entity), were not entirely 
without merit, at least when assessed from a long-term perspective.3  
Aside from these economic considerations and the inevitable puzzles that they 
engender, a concern of a more legal nature arises in connection with the purchase 
of a property burdened by a mortgage. The mortgagor buys a property and this 
formally belongs to the borrower. In reality, if the latter was not in a position to 
maintain the agreed repayment plan in the form of instalments, usually 
encompassing both the capital and interest, the lender is entitled to repossess the 
property, thereby evicting the mortgagor from his investment.4  
Contemplated from within the context of this complex set of circumstances, the 
‘credulous’ consumer jumping unwittingly onto ‘the property ladder’ has 
become a matter of grave concern, also in the eyes of the EU legislator. A new 
piece of legislation, Directive 2014/17 (‘Mortgage Credit Directive’ or ‘MCD’) 
has been passed on 4 February 2014,5 to react to and address the adverse 
                                                          
1 To elaborate historically the events occurred, property buyers, who had purchased their ‘good’ at the pick of the 
market, were forced in the medium term to pay for an underlying property that, in reality, did not reflect any 
longer the original value. 
2 Britain would be an example of this positive performance. See The Guardian, ‘Average UK Flat Value Rises 
60% in Past Decade’ (23 September 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/sep/23/average-uk-flat-
value-rises-60-per-cent-past-decade> accessed 25 September 2015. 
3 G Matysiak and P Wang, ‘Commercial Property Market Prices and Valuations: Analysing the Correspondence’ 
(1995)12 Journal of Property Research 181-2002. 
4 In Section 8 below, a discussion on the consequences of these legal provisions of a civil proceeding nature on 
the main legal systems in the EU (the common law and the civil law ones) is provided.  
5 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements 
for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. (OJ L60). The Directive entered into force on 20 March 2014, on the 
twentieth day following its publication on the Official Gazette of the European Union. Such a publication has 
occurred on 28 February 2014. The Directive is applicable to EEA countries too. 
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consequences that stem from ‘irresponsible lending and borrowing and the 
potential scope for irresponsible behaviour by market-participants including 
credit intermediaries and non-credit institutions.’6  
The transposition of this Directive is not immediate.7 According to art 42(1) of 
the Mortgage Credit Directive, each Member State ‘shall adopt and publish, by 
21 March 2016, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with the Directive.’ This precept is accompanied by an obligation on the 
Member State to ‘communicate to the Commission the text of those measures.’8 
However, the Directive shall not apply to credit agreements which were in effect 
prior to 21 March 2016,9 irrespective of when it becomes incorporated within the 
domestic legislation of each country. Accordingly, the legal provisions 
encompassed therewith have taken effect concurrently across the Union on 21 
March 2016. In other words, regardless of how swiftly a country implements the 
Directive, the date from which it has taken effect has not been earlier, nor later, 
than 21 March 2016. 
An example of swift implementation of the aforementioned Directive is evident 
in the case of Britain, where the EU piece of legislation under discussion has been 
transposed in force of the Mortgage Credit Directive Order 2015 (SI 2015/910). 
This has amended current British legislation on the matter at hand, particularly 
the Financial Markets and Services Act 2000. Incidentally, the British 
Government has decided not to pursue the alternate ‘copy-out’ option in the 
transposition of the directive at stake. This would have directed the UK legislature 
to abolish the rules of protection of the mortgage consumer already enshrined 
within the FMSA 2000 and, as a consequence, created uncertainty for the 
prospective buyers.10  
 
2. The Mortgage Credit Directive and its main principles 
As to the merit of the specific legal provisions, the statute at stake stipulates that, 
although each Member State is not prevented ‘from maintaining or introducing 
more stringent provisions in order to protect consumers’,11 a more robust support 
platform shall be provided to the benefit of the consumer by each jurisdiction as 
a means to establishing a more responsible outlook to borrowing and debt 
management, ‘in particular in relation to mortgage credit agreements’.12   
                                                          
6 See Recital 4 of Directive 2014/17. 
7 According to art. 42, Directive 2014/17, Member State ‘shall adopt and publish, by 21 March 2016, the law and 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive.’ 
8 Article 42(3) of Directive 2014/17. 
9 Article 43(1) of Directive 2014/17.  
10 See HM Treasury, ‘The Implementation of the Mortgage Credit Directive. Summary of Responses’  (January 
2015, p 5) <  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397904/implementation_of_the_
EU_MCD_summary_of_responses.pdf > 
accessed 15 September 2015. 
11 Article 2(1) of Directive 2014/17. 
12 Ibid., article 6(1). 
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Fundamentally, there are two pillars on which the MCD rests. First, the new piece 
of legislation aims to create minimum regulatory requirements, addressed to 
Member States, the purpose of which is to safeguard a consumer seeking to take 
out credit agreements relating to residential properties. This purpose of Directive 
2014/17 has been questioned in its essence by some countries, particularly 
Britain. The UK Government has drawn attention to the fact that its legislature 
had already fashioned ‘a robust regulatory regime to protect consumers engaged 
in the first residential mortgage market.’13 This assertion will be verified within 
the confines of Section 8 below, specifically under the subsection dealing with 
foreclosure proceedings and art 28 of Directive 2014/17.   
Second, this EU statute should facilitate a more competent internal market of 
mortgage lending across Europe, in accordance with the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union. Irrespective of whether or not these 
assumptions are factually corroborated, a more transparent and efficient market 
in this area ‘is vital in promoting the development of cross-border activity and 
creating an internal market for credit agreements relating to residential 
immovable property.’14 In this respect, it has been counterclaimed by some 
countries15 that the MCD would not remove the primary obstacles of the internal 
market, viz. the lender’s difficulty ‘in understanding unfamiliar markets and the 
complexity in enforcing loans under foreign legal systems.’16 
From a regulatory point of view, the MCD designates an authority to oversee the 
application of the novel piece of legislation.17 This power shall ensure that the 
designated authorities ‘are granted investigating and enforcement powers and 
adequate resources necessary for the efficient and effective performance of these 
duties.’18 The power to designate such an authority is vested with each Member 
State. Nevertheless, the eligible body shall be a public authority, or a body 
recognised by national law or a public authority ‘expressly empowered for that 
purposes by national law.’19  Notwithstanding the discretion left to each Member 
State in such a decision, under no circumstances shall such an authority embody 
creditors, credit intermediaries or appointed representatives and/or relevant 
                                                          
13 See HM Treasury, ‘The Implementation of the Mortgage Credit Directive. Summary of Responses’  (January 
2015, 
p 3) <  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397904/implementation_of_the_
EU_MCD_summary_of_responses.pdf > 
accessed 15 September 2015.  
14 Recital 2 of the MCD. 
15 The British Government, in the run-up to the domestic implementation of the DCD, seems to be very sceptical 
and dubious about the two rationes essendi of the MCD.  
16 See HM Treasury, ‘The Implementation of the Mortgage Credit Directive. Summary of Responses’  (January 
2015, 
p 3) <  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397904/implementation_of_the_
EU_MCD_summary_of_responses.pdf > 
accessed 15 September 2015.  
17 MCD, art 5(1).  
18 Ibid. 
19 Art 5(1). 
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associations. The obvious reason for this is to negate the potential that any 
conflict of interest may arise.20  
In Italy, for instance, this role shall be given to the Banca d’Italia, the Italian 
central Bank that is in charge of both the functions, the assessment of the stability 
of the financial institutions and the prudent conduct vis-a-vis the clientele.21 
Conversely, in Britain, this role has been assigned to the Prudential Regulation 
Authority, the authority charged with safeguarding the consumer against any 
form of exploitation perpetrated by credit institutions whilst offering their 
products. In critically assessing the new norms, it can be affirmed that, in cases 
where, like in Britain, the supervision is a twin-peak one,22 the manner in which 
the Directive is drafted is not conducive to the level of consistency and 
effectiveness that it could, or should, demonstrate.23 As highlighted during the 
2008/2009 financial crisis, the intermediaries’ reckless conduct in too 
nonchalantly granting mortgages may eventually have a detrimental impact on 
the same stability of the creditors. Therefore, Directive 2014/17 should have 
clearly imposed a mandatory role to be held by the national authority in 
connection with the two supervisory purposes (both stability of the credit 
institution and transparent conduct ascribable to it). 
Regardless of the authority appointed, the MCD states in no uncertain terms that 
‘all persons who work or who have worked for the competent authorities, as well 
as auditors and experts instructed by the competent authorities, are bound by the 
obligation of professional secrecy.’24   
 
3. A legal analysis of the Mortgage Credit Directive  
3.1.The area of applicability  
The Consumer Credit Directive (‘CCD’)25 had already shaped, at EU level, a 
new category of consumer. The relevant contracts to which this legislation 
applies are credit contracts with consumers. In the aforementioned Directive, the 
definition of consumer is reminiscent of that inferred under the general rules of 
the Unfair Terms Directive (‘UTD’).26 Thus, the consumer is ‘the natural person 
who, in transactions covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are 
outside his trade, business or profession’.27 Remarkably, the transactions falling 
within the ambit of the CCD are credit agreements. More specifically, a credit 
agreement is ‘an agreement whereby a creditor grants or promises to grant to a 
consumer credit in the form of a deferred payment, loan or other similar financial 
                                                          
20 Art 5(2), MCD. 
21 Article 2 of the Legislative Decree no 385 of 1st September 1993 (the Italian Banking Act). 
22 The Prudential Regulation Authority in charge of the conduct of the intermediaries vis-à-vis the public and the 
Financial Policy Committee deputed to supervise the stability of credit institutions.  
23  Nevertheless, it may be arduous to say that across the Channel there is an actual infringement of the MCD as 
regards the way it has been implemented. 
24 Art 5(2), MCD. 
25 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ L 133). 
26 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ L095).   
27 Article 3(a) of the Consumer Credit Directive. 
 
 
6 
 
accommodation, … , where the consumer pays for such services or goods for the 
duration of their provision by means of instalments.’28 It is a well-known fact 
that the category of the consumer credit agreement does not encompass, by way 
of an express exclusion of the EU legislature, credit agreements ‘involving a total 
amount of credit less than Euro 200 or more than Euro 75.000’. 
Against this background, an individual asking a bank for a credit relating to the 
purchase of a residential property is a further category of consumer which the 
recent piece of legislation, Directive 2014/17, has expressly acknowledged. In 
practical terms, this is the person who, for himself or on behalf of his family, 
lodges an application with a lender, typically in the form of a credit institution, 
for a loan. The ultimate purpose of the application is to buy a property, with a 
specific guarantee (security or mortgage) provided by the client (the borrower) 
on the acquired property and given to the benefit of the lender.  
Article 1 of Directive 2014/17 clarifies the ambit of applicability of the new piece 
of legislation. The categories of contract fall into two mainly areas. The first one 
relates to credit agreements ‘which are secured either by a mortgage or by 
another comparable security commonly used in a Member State on residential 
immovable property or secured by a right related to residential immovable 
property …’.29 Because the MCD does not distinguish between first and second 
charge mortgage, it is implied that the latter credit agreements too are subject to 
the new rules.30 A further category caters for credit agreements ‘the purpose of 
which is to acquire or retain property rights in land or in an existing or projected 
building.’31 
3.2. Exempt transactions 
Not all mortgages fall within the perimeter of Directive 2014/17. Article 3(2) of 
the Mortgage Credit Directive exempts from the boundaries of the new 
legislation some significant transactions. These exemptions are mandatory. In 
other words, Member States have no option but to implement such an exemption 
in their respective national legal frameworks. 
First and foremost, equity release credit agreements are not included within the 
transaction to which the MCD applies.32 These are agreements occurring when 
two concurrent conditions are met: on the one hand, the creditor ‘contributes a 
lump sum, periodic payments or other forms of credit disbursement in return for 
a sum deriving from the future sale of a residential immovable property or a right 
relating to residential immovable property’; on the other hand, the creditor ‘will 
                                                          
28 Ibid., art 3(c). 
29 Articles 3(1)(a) of the Mortgage Credit Directive. 
30 This interpretation is supported by the same authorities. See, in Britain, the Financial Conduct Authority. FCA, 
‘Mortgage Credit Directive’ (13 March 2015) < https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/firm-types/mortgage-brokers-and-
home-finance-lenders/mcd> accessed 16 September 2015.  
On such a ground, the British Government has decided that second charge mortgage regulation should move from 
the FCA's consumer credit regime into the FCA mortgage regime. This means that, to carry on second charge 
mortgage business after 21 March 2016, lenders, administrators and brokers have to be authorised and hold the 
correct mortgage permissions. 
31 Article 3(1)(b) of the Mortgage Credit Directive. 
32 Ibid., art 3(2)(a). 
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not seek repayment of the credit until the occurrence of one or more specified 
life events of the consumer, …, unless the consumer breaches his contractual 
obligations which allows the creditor to terminate the credit agreement.’  
Additionally, the generous loan afforded by the employer, as a secondary 
activity, to its employee whereby the latter may buy a property, is also exempt, 
so long as this credit agreement ‘is offered free of interest or at an APRC lower 
than those prevailing on the market and not offered to the public generally.’33 
Further categories of exempt mortgages are: ‘credit agreements where the credit 
is granted free of interest and without any other charges except those that recover 
costs directly related to the securing of the credit’;34 ‘credit agreements in the 
form of an overdraft facility and where the credit has to be repaid within one 
month’;35 ‘credit agreements which are the outcome of a settlement reached in 
court or before another statutory authority’;36 ‘credit agreements which relate to 
the deferred payment, free of charge, of an existing debt …’37  
In addition to these mortgages that are excluded on a mandatory basis, the MCD 
refers to further mortgages that can be excluded at the discretion of each Member 
State. These categories are basically those contemplated at article 3(3)(a), 
3(3)(b), 3(3)(c), 3(3)(d), 3(3)(e), in respect of which the decision rests 
exclusively with the Member State as to whether or not to apply the new rules of 
the Directive. The caveat in this case is that a Member State which decides not 
to apply the Directive shall put in place an ‘appropriate framework at a national 
level for this type of credit.’38 
Among these categories, it is worth drawing attention to art 3(3)(b) of Directive 
2014/17. The legal provision refers to credit agreements concerned with an 
immovable property that ‘cannot at any time be occupied as a house, apartment 
or another place of residence by the consumer or a family member of the 
consumer and is to be occupied as a house, apartment or another place of 
residence on the basis of a rental agreement.’39 In simpler terms, this refers to 
the buy-to-let mortgage,40 properties bought by an investor in order to let it out.  
Among the different Member States, Britain is the sole country that has decided 
to exercise its right to exemption in relation to these transactions.41 Yet, as far as 
the same concept of buy-to-let mortgage is concerned, the UK definition of this 
kind of mortgage used to be decidedly ‘loose’. In detail, it was extended also to 
circumstances where at least 60% of the property was let out. In other words, so 
long as no more than 40% of the property was occupied by the borrower or the 
                                                          
33 Ibid., art 3(2)(b). 
34 Ibid., art 3(2)(c). 
35 Ibid., article 3(2)(d). 
36 Ibid., art 3(2) (e). 
37 Ibid., art 3(2)f.  
38 Article 3(4) of the MCD. 
39 Ibid., art 3(3)(b). 
40 From a commercial point of observation of this niche property sub-area, see A Leyshon and S French, ‘ “We 
All Live in a Robbie Fowler House”: the Geographies of the Buy to Let Market in the UK’ (2009)11 The British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations 438-460.    
41 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Mortgage Credit Directive Order 2015 2015 No. 910.  
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family member, the relevant mortgage lending could have been excluded, as 
falling within the category of buy-to-let mortgages. As a result of the legal 
provisions of the MCD, this British approach has required a change to the 
domestic legislation, given that it is no longer consistent with the new framework 
implemented last March 2016.42 
 
4. The general rules applicable to those offering and/or brokering mortgages 
The mortgage is not simply a banking product but, given the current dimensions 
of the market behind it, is an actual industry in itself. It follows from this that 
multifarious activities are implied in the relevant process, ranging from the 
advisory activity to the signing of the contract.  
First, a mortgage, as a credit product, can be manufactured by a bank or other 
market players. Additionally, the same product can be marketed, by the same 
bank but also by intermediaries. Finally, an advisory activity can be provided to 
the market in connection with a mortgage. In all these scenarios, the overriding 
principle is that the creditor, the credit intermediary or the appointed 
representative, must adhere to a need to act ‘honestly, fairly, transparently and 
professionally, taking into account the interests of the consumers.’43  
Remarkably, those subject to these rules of conduct are not simply the creditors, 
but also the credit intermediaries and the appointed representatives. As regards 
the ‘creditor’, the Directive under discussion opts for a particularly broad 
definition: ‘a natural or legal person who grants or promises to grant credit falling 
within the scope of Article 3 in the course of his trade, business or profession.’44 
The legal provision, therefore, is more extensive than expected, as it 
encompasses not simply the traditional bank (the lender by definition, the 
mortgagee who is the beneficiary of the mortgage) but also any other individual 
or, as is more likely, legal entity engaged in that business. 
The ‘credit intermediary’ is defined as a natural or legal person who ‘presents or 
offers credit agreements to consumers’, or ‘assists consumers by undertaking 
preparatory work or other pre-contractual administration in respect of credit 
agreements …’, or ‘concludes credit agreements with consumers on behalf of the 
creditor’.45 
Finally, the ‘appointed representative’ is the ‘natural or legal person who 
performs [core and ancillary activities connected with mortgages] that is acting 
                                                          
42 See what predicted in advance by the same authorities. HM Treasury, ‘Implementation of the EU Mortgage 
Credit Directive: Summary of  Responses’ (January 2015, 10) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/implementation-of-the-eu-mortgage-credit-directive> accessed 16 
September 2015. 
43 Directive 2014/17, Article 7(1). See M Haentjens and P de Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and Financial 
Law (Routledge 2015) 71. 
44 Directive 2014/17, art 4(2). 
45 Ibid., art 4(5). 
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on behalf of and under the full and unconditional responsibility of only one credit 
intermediary.’46 
 
5. Rules of conduct for those engaged in the mortgage market: general 
information; pre-contractual information: the creditworthiness 
More stringent rules are imposed on lenders in respect to the way they conduct 
their business in this delicate market. In this respect, the piece of EU legislation 
rests on three fundamental pillars. 
 
5.1.General information 
The ‘macro-rules’ established by Directive 2014/17 relate to the general 
information administered to the public, in cases where credit agreements were 
offered to the market.  
In this respect, two legal provisions are worth acknowledging. 
Firstly, the manner in which credit agreements are advertised to the public (art. 
11) is crucial. In this respect, any advertising concerning credit agreements of 
this kind shall refer, on a mandatory basis, to ‘an interest rate or any figures 
relating to the cost of the credit’ (art. 11(1)).   
Secondly, art. 13 of Directive 2014/17 stipulates that each Member State shall 
ensure that any communication ‘on paper or on other durable medium or on 
electronic form’ is ‘clear and comprehensible’. This obligation shall be complied 
with not simply by the creditors, but also by ‘tied credit intermediaries” and their 
‘appointed representatives.’ 
5.2.Pre-contractual information 
An additional set of rules enshrined within Directive 2014/17 are those relating 
to the contracts. Although the arena of contract law is traditionally deemed a 
‘national’ one, ergo reserved to the discretion of each Member State as it is 
considered the realm of private or commercial law, the Directive does not refrain 
from dictating some noteworthy rules relating to the requirements for pre-
contractual information. According to Directive 2014/17, art 14, the creditor, 
pursuant to the specific legal provisions that each Member State is under an 
obligation to implement by March 2016, shall provide the consumer with 
‘personalised information needed to compare the credits available on the market, 
assess their implication and make an informed decision on whether to conclude 
a credit agreement’. This information is specified as ‘pre-contractual’: it precedes 
the conclusion of the contract or, to use the terminology of the legislator, is to be 
made available ‘in good time before the consumer is bound by any credit 
agreement or offer.’ 
Similarly, the creditor, according to article 16 of Directive 2014/17, is under an 
obligation of provide ‘adequate explanations’ to the consumer ‘on the proposed 
credit agreements and any ancillary services’. The concept of ancillary services 
                                                          
46 Ibid., art 4(8). 
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is not clarified in terms of its boundaries. This expression, which is not within 
the definitions of CMD, may encompass any product, whether of a financial 
nature or not and irrespective of whether or not it was issued by the same lender, 
where a causal link can be established with the subscription of the credit 
agreement.47 In this respect, the terminology adopted by the EU legislator, in the 
English version of Directive 2014/17, is probably not without its flaws. In the 
context of the new piece of legislation, what is considered ancillary should 
include also products connected with the mortgage, viz. an insurance policy. 
Therefore, in order to give a sense to the legislation, service should be interpreted 
as broadly as is possible to include services and products; otherwise, the area of 
applicability of the term would be too limited. 
5.3.Credit worthiness 
Regardless of the nature of the ancillary services, the general goal of the 
‘adequate explanation’ at stake is to ensure that the credit agreement proposed to 
the client and the ancillary product is ‘adapted to his needs and financial 
situation’.  
The degree of creditworthiness displayed by the client is an additional matter of 
concern in the mortgage market. Art 18 of the directive under discussion deals 
with this. The creditworthiness of the borrower is a crucial barometer with which 
to assess whether the credit agreement can be entered into and, ultimately, the 
mortgage granted. In this respect, the tenor of the MCD is clear-cut:  
‘Member States shall ensure that, before concluding a credit agreement, 
the creditor makes a thorough assessment of the consumers’ 
creditworthiness. The assessment shall take appropriate account of factors 
relevant to verifying the prospect of the consumer to meet his obligations 
under the credit agreement.’48 
More specifically, the assessment of creditworthiness shall not ‘rely 
predominantly on the value of the residential immovable property exceeding the 
amount of the credit or the assumption that the residential immovable property 
will increase in value …’49 
The approach, in this respect, is expected to be revolutionary as it appears to 
thrust a ‘red card’ in the direction of previous practices. It is widely accepted that 
the 2008 financial crisis was also triggered to a degree by the property market 
bubble and the overly generous propensity of lenders to grant mortgages in the 
previous period by simply relying on the increasing value of the ‘underlying 
                                                          
47 A lucid example can be that of the British market of mortgages and the ‘PPI scandal’ (Policy Protection 
Insurance). A PPI is basically an insurance product which insures the repayment of the mortgage in case of major 
events affecting the borrower, such as death, illness or disability, or job loss. However, it was discovered in 2011 
that this product had been sold to millions of UK borrowers, but the consumers were not informed of their 
existence or, if informed, they could not rely on the correct information about costs, and mechanism of 
functioning. See M Haentjens and P de Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and Financial Law (Routledge 
2015) 73. 
48 Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/17. 
49 Ibid., art 18(3). 
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asset’ (the property).50 Such an attitude means that any minimal decrease in the 
value of the property market, which is more than possible in the short-medium 
term, would render the borrower vulnerable. If forced to sell the asset during that 
period, he would find himself in negative equity, which means that what is he is 
required to repay to the bank for the loan, plus the lump sum he has advanced to 
buy the property, will exceed the actual value of the property.  
Recital 55 seems to be particularly aware of this concern. 
‘… Consequently, the possibility that the value of the immovable property 
could exceed the credit amount or could increase in the future should not 
generally be a sufficient condition for granting the credit in question. …’ 
The only exception is the mortgage requested by the customer in order to 
construct or modernise an immovable property: in such a case, the value of the 
property can be the prevailing parameter of assessment.51  
Similarly, the same Recital gives a mandate to each Member State ‘to issue 
additional guidance on those or additional criteria and on methods to assess a 
consumers’ creditworthiness’. Among these, specific mention can be made of 
loan-to-value limits and loan-to-income ratios. Needless to say, the Principles for 
Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices issued by the Financial 
Stability Board should be encapsulated within each Member State.52 
Further legal provisions contained in the article 18 under discussion are the 
following: art 18(2) in force of which ‘the procedures and information on which 
the assessment is based are established documented and maintained’; article 
18(4) which conversely sets forth the obligation, borne by the creditor, to ensure 
that once the credit agreement is concluded this contract is not altered or 
cancelled ‘on the grounds that the assessment of creditworthiness was incorrectly 
conducted’.  
It can be said, therefore, that art 18 of Directive 2014/17, with hindsight, 
constitutes a ‘reprimand’ for much of the banking practices which spiralled out 
of control at the onset of the present millennium and where an assessment of the 
mortgage was superficially based on the value of the property to purchase (and 
the accompanying assumption that it would increase). Conversely, as from 
March 2017, the correct criterion to establish the feasibility of the mortgage shall 
be based primarily on the ability of the borrower to repay the instalments from 
his own income. The value of the property shall be a factor, but not the prevailing 
one.53 
                                                          
50 In the vest economic literature, see inter alia Y Demyanyk & O Van Hemert, ‘Understanding the Subprime 
Crisis’ (2011)24(6) The Review of Financial Studies 1848-1880; AV Thakor, ‘The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: 
Why did It Happen and What did We Learn’ (2015)4 Review of Corporate Finance Studies (2) 155-205.  
51 Art 18(3) and Recital 55 of the Directive 2014/17. 
52 Directive 2014/17, Recital 55. 
53 M Haentjens and P de Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and Financial Law (Routledge 2005) 72-73. 
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5.4. Property evaluation; disclosure and verification of consumer information 
Chapter 6, headed ‘Creditworthiness Assessment’ is integrated with two 
additional legal provisions: the property evaluation; the disclosure and 
verification of consumer information. 
5.4.a. Property evaluation 
Article 19 of Directive 2014/17 stipulates that each country ensure that ‘reliable 
standards for the valuation of residential immovable property for mortgage 
lending purposes’ are developed. These standards shall be adhered to on a 
mandatory basis by creditors and the onus lies on each country to ensure that 
compliance with this rule is observed. In this respect, the role of the appraisers, 
either working within the structure of the bank or outside, is critical. Potentially, 
if not qualified, they could give rise to a new bubble by simply inflating the 
market value of the property. Thus, the requirement of the Directive under 
discussion is that the appraiser ‘can provide an impartial and objective valuation, 
which shall be documented in a durable medium and of which a record shall be 
kept by the creditor.’54 
In this respect, one of the British jurisdictions, the Scottish one, may have 
unconsciously and involuntarily implemented this philosophy of the EU 
Directive well in advance of its recent implementation. In fact, in that jurisdiction 
there is a system (the home report) whereby, before a property is marketed, a 
home report should be drafted by a chartered surveyor. In the home report, there 
should be an indication of some significant elements, amongst which is the value 
of the property. This home report may be regarded to embody, mutatis mutandis, 
what Directive 2014/17 is asking any lender to do. Seemingly, Scotland shall not 
be required, on this specific aspect, to implement the Directive, as the function 
of the current home report adequately caters for the standards which the lender 
is required to comply with.    
5.4.b. Disclosure  
The disclosure and verification of consumer information, dealt with under art 29, 
brings to light a further issue: the proper consideration by the creditor of the 
documentation submitted by the borrower as evidence of his creditworthiness. 
This information, whether acquired from external sources or through internal 
channels, ‘shall be appropriately verified, including through reference to 
independently verifiable documentation when necessary’.55 This obligation rests 
not simply on the creditor but also on the credit intermediaries or appointed 
representatives: the latter shall ‘submit the necessary information obtained from 
the consumer to the relevant creditor to enable the creditworthiness assessment 
to be carried out.’56 
 
                                                          
54 Directive 2014/17, art 19. 
55 Ibid., art 20. 
56 Ibid., art 20(2). 
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6. The advisory activity relating to residential property credit agreements  
The offer to a consumer of a credit agreement relating to a residential property 
may be the outcome of an advisory activity carried out by the same creditor, but 
also by the credit intermediary or the appointed representative. The advisory 
activity can be either preceded by the conclusion of a specific contract or carried 
out informally, in conjunction with the offer of the mortgage. In both cases, the 
consumer shall be informed of the existence of an advisory activity. The reason 
for this is to ensure that he will not accrue any unexpected costs. On such a 
ground, the legal provisions of Directive 2014/17 stipulate that the Member 
States, in their respective legislations, must demand that the ‘operators’ provide 
the consumer with some specific pieces of information. These essentially fall 
under two categories: (a) the possible fees that this advisory activity may 
engender;57 (b) communication relating to the fact that the recommendation is 
given to the consumer ‘on considering only their own product range’ or also the 
products offered by non-tied credit intermediaries or appointed representatives 
of non-tied credit intermediaries.58 
6.1. Foreign currency mortgages 
Foreign currency loans are a further area where Directive 2014/17 has outlined 
its binding principles. The credit agreement, the currency of which is a foreign 
one is risky, for two reasons. First, it engenders an asymmetry: the consumer 
lives in a country where the currency is different from that of the loan. As a result, 
he cannot predict the fluctuations of the currency of the contact, simply because 
it differs from the currency in operation where he lives. Second, currency 
fluctuates by definition; the consumer, potentially unaware of this, may stand to 
lose a considerable sum of money if his instalment was to be paid in a currency 
that, in the meantime, had increased against its value reflected in his own 
country. Foreign currency mortgages have assumed the mantle of a battle ground 
where litigators, on the one side the lenders’ lawyers and on the other side the 
borrowers’ advisors, have waged their legal wars.59  
Directive 2014/17 is somehow the legacy of these skirmishes. Although the 
foreign currency agreement for purposes of the purchase of a residential property 
remains valid, the new legislation now requires that Member States adopt a more 
protective national framework. In detail, when the foreign currency is the 
currency of the contract, a specific right is conferred on the consumer: that is, ‘to 
convert the credit agreement into an alternative currency under specified 
conditions’. This replacement currency which the consumer can opt for is either 
‘the currency in which the consumer primarily receives income or holds assets 
from which the credit is to be repaid, as indicated at the time the most recent 
creditworthiness assessment in relation to the credit agreement was made’60 or 
                                                          
57 Ibid., art 22(2)(b). 
58 Ibid., art 22(2)(a). 
59 See, for instance, in Italy A Torrente and P Schlesinger, Manuale di Diritto Privato (22nd edn Giuffre’ Editore, 
Milan 2015) 691-693. 
60 Art 23(2)(a) of the MCD. 
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‘the currency of the Member State in which the consumer either was resident at 
the time the credit agreement was concluded or is currently resident.’61  
The first option (conversion of the currency of the contract into the currency 
where the consumer resides) is coupled with a corollary at the following 
paragraph 3: if the consumer exercised his right of conversion, the national 
legislation must ensure that ‘the exchange rate at which the conversion is carried 
out is the market exchange rate applicable on the day of application for 
conversion’. This is a norm safeguarding the consumer against arbitrary and 
discretionary creditors’ decisions. Nevertheless, the potentially innovative nature 
of the legal provision is softened, if not neutralised, by the caveat that the 
agreement can also stipulate otherwise.62  
6.2.Variable rates mortgages  
The variable rates agreements represent a further area of possible exploitation 
which unscrupulous banks may employ in their favour and thus against 
consumers. The variable rate lends itself to possible manipulations by the lender, 
as recent controversies across Europe have demonstrated. Second, the variable 
rate is risky, as it may expose the position of the borrower if the fluctuation 
resulted in a substantial increase of the rate. With this in mind, the mission 
adopted by the new legislation seems to one of securing transparency. The 
indexes or references at which the borrowing rate is calculated shall be ‘clear, 
accessible, objective’.63 Additionally, both the parties to the credit agreement 
and the authorities shall be able to verify it.64  
In accordance with the same line of reasoning, the ‘historical records of indexes 
for calculating the borrowing rates are maintained either by the providers of these 
indexes or the creditors.’65 This norm may be potentially extraordinary. Given 
this specific, express obligation and the way it is worded, in a scenario of judicial 
controversy between the borrower and the lender the lack of compliance with the 
relevant rules (therefore the absence of records in the archives of the bank) may 
give rise to a presumption: the lender did not apply the rate correctly, ergo the 
right of the borrower to claim damages. Similarly, the supervisory authority 
could infer from this absence a systematic failure of transparency vis-à-vis the 
customers of that bank, therefore a violation of prudential rules of conduct 
towards the clientele.66 Needless to say, despite the harmonisation, the EU 
countries and, therefore, the legal systems existing in each of them would play a 
decisive role in how the rules will be implemented.  
 
                                                          
61 Art 23(2)(b) of Directive 2014/17. 
62 This is criticized among Scholars. See M Haentjens and P de Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and 
Financial Law (Routledge 2005) 71-73. It looks like that the consumer receives the carrot, but the stick will 
immediately materialise behind it! 
63 Article 24(a) of the MCD. 
64 Ibid., art 24(a). 
65 Art 24(b) of Directive 2014/17. 
66 For instance, in Britain, in this scenario the Prudential Regulation Authority should step up to the plate and fine 
the credit institution that has breached these mandatory rules. 
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7. The nature of the rights under Directive 2014/17 
It is a commonly accepted axiom that the consumer is perennially relegated to a 
position of vulnerability vis-à-vis his professional counterparty. Aware of this 
adage, the Mortgage Credit Directive warns of the imperative nature of the rights 
conferred on the consumer in force of the Directive. In this respect, the consumers 
will be unable to ‘waive the rights conferred on them by national law transposing’ 
the Directive 2014/17. Furthermore, the way in which the Directive is transposed 
shall be in such a way as to render unfeasible the possibility that the consumer 
may lose his protection, because of the way the ‘agreements are formulated’.67 A 
possible practice that must be prohibited by the national legislation is that of 
permitting the integration of credit agreements, clearly falling within the scope of 
the MCD, in ‘credit agreements the character of which would make it possible to 
avoid the application of those measures.’ Such practices, clearly elusive and, 
therefore, prohibited for reasons of a public policy, could be easily detected by 
any national court. This, in cases where a legal claim was lodged, would be 
empowered to identify in a broader agreement the specific mortgage falling 
within the scope of the Directive and its possible inconsistencies.  
 
8. The foreclosure of the secured property in case of default: the principles of civil 
proceeding: common law and civil law perspective. 
Reference has been made, in the Introduction, to the fact that repossession, in 
cases of default of a debt, is the natural consequence of the lack of fulfilment of 
the obligations of a loan secured by a mortgage. This concept of ‘repossession’ 
can be manifested in a very different way and with a significant shift in intensity, 
according to whether the default takes place in common law jurisdictions or in 
countries which operate under the realm of civil law. In common law countries, 
such as Britain, the system of enforcement of the mortgage is still permeated by 
neo-liberal values.68 In essence, the mortgagee, in cases where the mortgagor 
was not in a position to honour his obligations, is entitled to immediately take 
possession of the secured property.69 Conversely, this system would be unlawful 
in most civil law jurisdictions, where typically the creditor is simply entitled to 
ask for the sale, through the medium of public auction, of the secured heritable 
property. Thus, the mortgagee will retain the proceeds of the sale whereas the 
secured property will be in the hands of a third party, the party who proved 
successful in offering the highest price.  
8.1. The derogation from the prohibition of agreement of forfeiture 
In civil law jurisdictions, such as Italy, a pure repossession would again adhere 
to the principle of the mandatory prohibition of the ‘pactum commissorium’. The 
latter is the agreement whereby the creditor and debtor agree that, in cases 
whether the secured obligations were not honoured, the ownership of the secured 
property will be automatically transferred to the creditor. In a number of civil 
                                                          
67 Article 41(b) of Directive 2014/17. 
68 See, more recently, from a law and economics perspective, S Nield, ‘Mortgage Market Review: ‘Hard-Wired 
Common Sense/’ 2015(38) Journal of Consumer Policy 139-159, particularly 156. 
69 Although a Court order is nonetheless required. See section 88 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
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law jurisdictions, such as Italy, the agreement shall be regarded as null and void, 
irrespective of any legal provision to the contrary by the parties.70 The rationale 
behind these entrenched legislative stances is that the borrower’s other creditors 
would be defrauded as they are deprived of an asset that otherwise they would 
be entitled to claim.71 In Italy, again, the possible invalidity of the agreement of 
forfeiture, in connection with specific commercial transactions such as the sale 
and lease back agreements, has been better defined and, to a certain extent, 
curtailed at judicial level. According to Italy’s highest court, Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione,72 these contracts are valid despite their potential overlap with the 
principle of prohibition of agreement of forfeiture. However, it is important to 
ascertain, from time to time, whether the contract contains elements and/or 
features that may show that in reality that sale has been put in place exclusively 
for purposes of a guarantee. If this was the case, the agreement would seek to 
circumvent the prohibition and, therefore, is rendered invalid, as it contravenes 
a mandatory rule.73 Further elements that may potentially reveal symptoms of 
invalidity are: the existence of a creditor/debtor relationship between the bank, 
granting the credit, and the company selling the good; economic difficulties 
experienced by the companies selling the good; the disproportion existing 
between the value of the good and the consideration paid by the purchaser (the 
rentee in the sale and lease agreement).74 
In focusing now specifically on the EU legislation under discussion, it is 
interesting to note that Directive 2014/17 contains a regime in force of which, as 
far as mortgages on residential properties are concerned, the agreement of 
forfeiture can be derogated. In this respect, the precept of art 28(4) shall be 
recalled: 
‘Member states shall not prevent the parties to a credit agreement from expressly 
agreeing that return or transfer to the creditor of the security or proceeds from 
the sale of the security is sufficient to repay the credit.’  
It should be observed that, from a historical point of view, the MCD does not 
mark a revolutionary chapter in the annals of private law. Just over a decade ago, 
the Collateral Directive75 had already established a micro-regime of private 
foreclosure. The relevant rules, still applicable, empower the collateral taker, if 
this is agreed with the collateral provider,76 to use the collateral and to dispose 
                                                          
70 See, among the others, F Gazzoni, Manuale di Diritto Privato (ESI, Naples 2013) 661. At scholarly level, see 
more recently: G Busset, ‘Anche una Procura a Vendere può Violare il Divieto del Patto Commissorio? 
(Commento a Cass. Civ., III sez., 8.7.2014, n. 15486’ (2015)31 La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata 65-
73; S Pagliantini, ‘I Misteri del Patto Commissorio, le Precomprensioni degli Interpreti e il Diritto Europeo della 
Dir. 2014/17/EU’ (2015)38 Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 181-204; C De Menech, ‘Il Patto Marciano e gli 
Incerti Confini del Patto Commissorio’ [2015] Contratti 823-841.  
71 A Torrente and P Schlesinger, Manuale di Diritto Privato (22nd edn Giuffre’ Editore, Milan 2015) 481-483; F 
Gazzoni, Manuale di Diritto Privato (ESI 2013) 662.  
72 See the decisa no 5438 of 14 March 2006 and no 5583 of 9 March 2011. 
73 Doctrinally, see A Luminoso, ‘Lease Back, Mercato e Divieto del Patto Commissorio’ (2000)27  
Giurisprudenza Commerciale (2) 489-503.  
74 See again Italian Supreme Court no 5438 of 14 March 2006 and no 5583 of 9 March 2011. 
75 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral 
arrangements (OJ L 168/43). 
76 Article 12 of Directive 2002/47/EC. 
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of it, in order to enforce his credit. The area of application of this system is 
limited to transactions concluded between certain market participants, such as 
banks, central banks and financial institutions.77 Furthermore, some formal 
requirements must be met, specifically that where the collateral taker shall 
possess the collateral.78 Finally, the transactions concerned with the new 
discipline are either a title transfer financial collateral arrangement or a security 
financial collateral arrangement.79 
In some civil law jurisdictions such as the Italian one, there are some isolated 
opinions80 that this derogation, now permitted under legislation, is regarded as 
subject to a limit: the mortgage shall be ‘symmetric’. This expression may imply 
that, in jurisdictions where the agreement of forfeiture is prohibited,81 the judge 
will be equipped with the capacity to dis-apply the legal provision of art 28(4) if 
evidence was provided that the lender/borrower relationship was asymmetric. 
This conclusion, which may sound nebulous from a common law perspective,82 
will most certainly be tested in the years to come by the judiciary. Ultimately, 
according to this interpretation, the borrower will be furnished with the tools to 
tackle any arbitrary use of this power that the recent Directive grants to the 
lender, on the grounds that a degree of asymmetry may be detectable in the 
contract.    
8.2. Foreclosure of the secured property and protection of the consumer 
Coupled with art 28(4) is the legal provision, contained in the following art 28(5), 
where it is stipulated that, in circumstances where the ‘price obtained for the 
immovable property affects the amount owed by the consumer’, then ‘Member 
States shall have procedures or measures to enable the best efforts price for the 
foreclosed immovable property to be obtained.’ 
The precept is not entirely transparent in regard to the language utilised in the 
first part of art 28(5), particularly in its use of the expression ‘price obtained for 
the immovable property’. It is obvious that in a mortgage the heritable property 
is given by the borrower as a security. If the mortgagor does not keep up the 
repayment, then the mortgagee forecloses on the mortgage. 
The specific proceedings have been thus far left to the discretion of each 
jurisdiction. Fundamentally, the consideration received as a result of the sale 
(either public or private) of the property is given to the mortgagee who will use 
the proceeds of the sale to repay the residual loan. An example may clarify this. 
There is a Euro 100.000 20 year loan for the purchase of a heritable property. 
The mortgagor, after 10 years, defaults on his debts. At that point the bank has 
already been the beneficiary of a succession of instalments and interest accrued 
over a 10 year period. However, for the recovery of the remainder, it sells the 
                                                          
77 Ibid., article 1(2). 
78 Ibid., article 1(5). 
79 Ibid., article 1(5). 
80 S Pagliantini, ‘I Misteri del Patto Commissorio, le Precomprensioni degli Interpreti e il Diritto Europeo della 
Dir. 2014/17/EU’ (2015) Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 195. 
81 Again, Italy can be an example. 
82 This is inferable from the general principles of common law in Britain. See, among others, E McKendrick, 
Contract Law (11th edn Palgrave Macmillan, London 2015).  
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property and the proceeds of the sale would invariably be sufficient to repay the 
residual loan. Needless to say, if from the sale of the secured property the bank 
received a sum in excess of that of the residual loan, this is expected to be 
returned to the borrower.    
The new EU piece of legislation aims to put in place a system whereby the 
proceedings existing in each EU country are reviewed and reassessed so as to 
ensure that the best price can be achieved through the enforcement process. It is 
obvious that the best price for the property is essential in order to safeguard the 
interests of the borrower. The higher the price resulting from the sale, the higher 
are the possibilities for the debtor to recover a sum of money.  
If this is the goal of the novel legislation as regards this specific point, then each 
country is required to review its civil proceedings to ensure that its system is 
consistent with the underpinning philosophy of the new EU piece of legislation. 
Thus, article 28(5) of Directive 2014/17 constitutes a warning to the different EU 
countries.  
8.2.a. England and Wales 
The recipients of this warning may be, first and foremost, common law 
jurisdictions such as the British one. In the UK, particularly in England and 
Wales, where the borrow traditionally benefits from a more limited protection,  
the same concept of pure repossession detailed at the beginning of the present 
Section 8 could constitute a violation of the new statutory terms.83 The pure 
repossession and the entitlement given to the lender to simply claim the property 
and to sell it privately may raise more than a few eyebrows.84 In this private 
mechanism of foreclosure of the secured property, the borrower would seem to 
play a decidedly passive role, as he is rendered helpless to the actions of the 
lender.85  
                                                          
83 More recently, among Scholars (L Whitehouse, ‘The First Legal Mortgagor: a Consumer without Adequate 
Protection?’ (2015)38 Journal of Consumer Policy 161-180) emphasis is placed on the status of the mortgagor, 
arguing in favour of a shift from the private law conception of the mortgagor as ‘landowner’ to the public law 
conception of the mortgagor as ‘consumer’. To a certain extent, this is achieved via the recent Directive 2014/17, 
although the Damocles’ sword hanging on the head of this recent piece of legislation is the recent Brexit vote cast 
by the British electorate and, therefore, the possibility for Britain to get rid of any form of adequate protection of 
this category of consumer.   
84 A different view emerges from the reading of the British Government’s report (British Government, 
Implementation of the EU Mortgage Credit Directive 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/implementation-of-the-eu-mortgage-credit-
directive/implementation-of-the-eu-mortgage-credit-directive#fn:1> accessed on 18 July 2016) it is emphasised 
that the UK already replies on a robust regulatory regime the purposes of which is to protect consumers engaged 
in the first charge residential mortgage market. More specifically, according to this report (Ibid), under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), ‘the independent regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) has the authority to put in place, supervise and enforce a range of rules to ensure that firms act responsibly 
in their mortgage activities.’ The view advocated in this contribution is, by contrast, that this protection of the UK 
mortgage credit consumer was very tenuous and based on obsolete rules. As a result, a new EU regulation was 
required. 
85 It is important to note that in England and Wales, the mortgagee, as a result of a charge secured on an immovable 
property, is entitled to a statutory right to sell the asset. In this respect, section 85(1) of the Law of Property Act 
1925 stipulates:    
‘A mortgage of an estate in fee simple shall only be capable of being effected at law either by a demise 
for a term of years absolute, subject to a provision for cesser on redemption, or by a charge by deed 
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It is true that, in England and Wales, the mortgagee is not empowered to 
repossess the charged asset in a discretionary way. In this respect, section 
103(2)(i) of the Law of Property Act 1925 hints at the fact that the mortgagee 
shall give the mortgagor a notice ‘requiring payment of the mortgage money’. 
Additionally, the mortagee shall not be entitled to repossess the property unless 
there is a default in the payment of the mortgage money, or of part thereof, for 
‘three months after such service’. Furthermore, a previous court order shall be 
given, before the charged asset is sold.86 Coupled with this micro-system of 
protection of the mortgagor is the following section 105 where it is stipulated 
that the money received by the mortgagee, arising from the sale, after the 
payment of encumbrances relating to the charged asset, shall be paid ‘to the 
person entitled to the mortgaged property’, therefore the debtor. This latest rule, 
not totally clear, fundamentally means that the mortgagee is prevented from 
cherry-picking form the sale of the charged asset: any retention of money that 
exceeds what the mortgagee is entitled to receive, would breach such a norm.  
Despite these legal provisions and practices, it is not so speculative to figure out 
a legislative reform in Britain so that the protection afforded to the mortgagor 
across the Channel is aligned across the three different British jurisdictions.87 
This should take into account the ‘public’ status of the mortgagor, recently 
conferred on the mortgagor by the EU legislative. Irrespective of the recent EU 
reform, the need for a more modern legal framework in this area is justified by 
the nine decades passed since the promulgation of the current legislation (the 
Law of Property Act 1925). Paradoxically, this auspice could now be jeopardised 
by the recent Brexit vote, although the lack of clarity about the UK status upon 
completion of the exit process may render a prognosis of this still too risky.    
8.2.b. Civil law jurisdictions 
Civil law jurisdictions may also fall foul of the indirect scrutiny of article 28(5). 
Although in these countries the mechanism of enforcement is public, therefore 
delegated to an external party (the judiciary), the position of the borrower and 
his expectations to be treated fairly could be seriously undermined. Countries 
such as Italy, for instance, where the civil proceedings aimed at the sale of the 
secured property may last years, may not exactly reflect a country offering 
protection to the borrower. If the sale of a property takes place years after the 
initial recovery of the good, both the conditions of the good88 and the variations 
in the market conditions may have had a detrimental effect on the value achieved 
through the sale and, ultimately, may cause a significant loss to be sustained by 
                                                          
expressed to be by way of legal mortgage: Provided that a first mortgagee shall have the same right to 
the possession of documents as if his security included the fee simple.’ 
86 This is also spelled out by the British Government. See British Government, Repossession 
<https://www.gov.uk/repossession/repossession-orders> accessed 1st July 2016,  
87 For sake of completeness of analysis, reference can be made to the repossession of a tenancy and the possible 
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights: judicially, see Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2011] 
UKSC 6. Among Scholars, see S Nield and N Hopkins, ‘Human Rights and Mortgage Repossession: beyond 
Property Law using Article 8’ (2013)33 Legal Scholars 431-454.  
88 By definition, a property becomes obsolete and its value is eventually negatively affected, if it is not adequately 
maintained. 
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the borrower.89 In light of this scenario, and taking into account the new art 28(4) 
of the MCD, it is possible to conclude that the pactum marcianum,90 existing in 
some civil law jurisdictions such as the Italian one, would be valid. This is the 
agreement whereby the creditor, in cases where the debtor defaulted, is entitled 
to ask for the sale of the secured good (or property) albeit at a value that is 
decided by a third independent party. The pactum marcianum,91 as an alternative 
form of the pactum commissorium, already regarded as valid in civil law 
jurisdictions,92 could constitute a mechanism to embed in the national legislation 
in order to fully mirror and validly implement the underpinning philosophy of 
article 28(4) of the MCD.   
Not dissimilar is the reasoning applicable to the second part of art 28(5). It is 
affirmed more specifically that, in circumstances where ‘after foreclosure 
proceedings outstanding debt remains’, then ‘Member States shall ensure that 
measures to facilitate repayment in order to protect consumers are put in place.’ 
The precept would appear to suggest that the borrower, who still owes the lender 
a sum of money despite the realisation of the secured property, cannot be asked 
to pay the entire amount. This would be a double-whammy for that borrower: he 
loses his property and then still faces having to immediately repay the entire 
amount of the possible residual debt to the lender.  
The purpose of this precept is clearly to safeguard the interests of the consumer. 
Accordingly, a jurisdiction, in order to comply with this new EU precept, should 
cater for it within its own domestic legislation. The tenor of the language used 
by the EU legislature does not facilitate a prediction of what, specifically, each 
country is expected to do in order to protect the consumer in circumstances of 
this kind. It is possible to predict that, in implementing the Directive at national 
level, either the lender will be required to write-off, merely partly or completely, 
the residual debt or to renegotiate the sum of residual debt. In the second case, 
national rules consistent with the new legislation could provide that, in case of 
                                                          
89 See, in the Italian literature, S Pagliantini, ‘I Misteri del Patto Commissorio, le Precomprensioni degli Interpreti 
e il Diritto Europeo della Dir. 2014/17/EU’ (2015) Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 196. 
90 More recently, it is recollected doctrinally (C De Menech, ‘Il Patto Marciano e gli Incerti Confini del Divieto 
del Patto Commissorio’ [2015] Contratti 823-841) that it was the Emperor Constantine who, under the increasing 
influence of the Christianity in Rome, ruled the abolishment of the Lex Commissoria. Until then, this law had 
regarded the practice of the agreement under discussion as totally lawful. Emperor Constantine’s statements, in 
abolishing the law, are perentory: ‘Quonian inter alias captiones proecipue commissoriae pignorum legis crescit 
asperitas, placet infirmari eam et in posterum eius memoriam aboleri’ (C. 8, 34, 3). 
91 The name given to this practice is courtesy of the jurist Elius Macianus who, after the Lex Commissoria was 
repealed, coma up with a legal stratagem, in order to allow the creditor to retake possession of the secured property, 
albeit with better guarantees for the debtor. The genesis of what it would be called later pactum marcianum can 
be found in a statement of the Digest (D. 20, I, 16, 9): 
‘Potest ita fieri pignoris datio hypothecaeve, ut, si intra certum tempus non sit soluta pecunia, iure emptoris 
possideat rem iusto pretio tunc aestimandam; hoc enim casu videtur quodammodo condicionalis esse venditio. Et 
ita divus Severus et Antonius resciperunt’. See more recently, in the Italian literature, C De Menech, ‘Il Patto 
Marciano e gli Incerti confini del Divieto del Patto Commissorio’ [2015] Contratti 823-841. 
92 In Italy, see Italian Supreme Court, no 5440 of 18 March 2015; no 1625 of 28 January 2015; no 10986 of 9 May 
2013. Among Scholars, see more recently, A Torrente and P Schlesinger, Manuale di Diritto Privato (22nd edn 
Giuffre’ Editore, Milan 2015) 483. 
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residual debt, the repayment shall occur no earlier than a specified point in time, 
depending on the sum of debt still owed.  
8.2.c. Art 28(2) and 28(3) 
Finally, art 28(2) and art 28(3) contains legal provisions which both relate to the 
charges that the borrower is usually required to pay by the lender, in connection 
with the residential property loan, in case of default. 
The first precept stipulates: 
‘Member States may require that, where the creditor is permitted to define 
and impose charges on the consumer arising from the default, those 
charges are no greater than is necessary to compensate the creditor for 
costs he has incurred as a result of the default.’93 
The second one affirms: 
‘Member States may allow creditors to impose additional charges on the 
consumer in the event of default. In that case Member states shall place a 
cap on those charges.’94 
There is certainly an economic rationale behind the EU legislature prompting the 
insertion of these two norms in the EU legal system. Banks are accustomed to 
imposing charges in case of default of the mortgagor; in some cases, these 
charges go well beyond the actual damages suffered by the lender. The charges, 
plus the interest that the bank has already received as remuneration during the 
period of the loan,95 may ultimately constitute an unfair advantage to the stronger 
party, in other words the lender. Furthermore, some jurisdictions, such as the 
English one, are quite lenient in dealing with these issues. They tend to turn a 
blind eye to what banks may do to the detriment of the consumer. Therefore, 
these practices have not yet given rise to any judicial objection. 
As a result of these new principles, encompassed within Directive 2014/17, any 
Member State should ensure that these charges are commensurate with the actual 
cost that the credit institution has incurred as a result of the default. Any 
additional charge shall be null and void, as it stands in violation of a clear and 
precise rule of the novel directive. It is unclear whether the concept of charges, 
which the EU legislature refers to, includes a consideration of interest too; in this 
case, not only would art 28 be innovative, but also it would be a revolutionary 
norm in jurisdictions such as the English one, where banks are nonchalantly 
permitted, in case of default, to capitalise on the interest.96  
                                                          
93 Article 28(2) of the MCD. 
94 Ibid., art 28(3). 
95 Technically speaking, this is called amortisation period. 
96 See Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft v Banque des Marchands de Moscou (1931) 4 LDAB 293 and, 
even more explicitly, National Bank of Greece S.A. (Appellant) v Pinios Shipping Co. No 1 and Another 
Respondents [1989] 3 WLR 1330.  
At common law, the bank entitlement to ask for compound interest traditionally depends on the contract expressly 
stipulating such an interest. Among Scholars, see WP Ellingers, E Lomnicka and CVM Hare, Ellinger’s Modern 
Banking Law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 762. More recently, see P de Gioia Carabellese, ‘Compound Interest and its 
Validity (or Invalidity) in the Bank-Customer Relationship: the State-of-the-Art of British Common Law 
Discussed by virtue of a Comparative Analysis’ (2016)5 Law and Economics Yearly Review (forthcoming). 
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Notwithstanding this, the charges connected with the default of the mortgagor 
cannot exceed a threshold that each country shall put in place. In other words, in 
each jurisdiction there is an obligation for the authority, through either regulation 
or legislation, to indicate for the mortgage the maximum amount of default 
charges that the credit institution can impose. This new regime may sound quite 
‘ordinary’ for civil law jurisdictions.97 However, in the case of common law 
jurisdictions, where traditionally banks tend to have unfettered discretionary 
power, the norm is of some significance.   
 
9. Conclusion 
The MCD has received a heterogeneous welcome across Europe. The 
comparatively warm reception demonstrated in countries such as Italy, for 
instance, contrasts markedly with the scepticism manifested in Britain.  
After analysing the main legal provisions of the MCD, it is difficult to offer forth 
a single shred of evidence to support the view that one of the main policy 
objectives of the statute, the possibility to create a common market of the lenders 
operating in the mortgage sector will be achieved. The offer of mortgages is 
historically fragmented across the different countries and/or jurisdictions and the 
level playing field anticipated by Directive 2014/17 seems to be more wishful 
thinking, rather than evidence of a forthcoming reality.98  
Yet, the new legal framework does bring something innovative and beneficial: 
the protection of the mortgage consumer, not simply as a consumer, but within 
an ad hoc philosophical categorisation. In this respect, the conduct that the credit 
institutions are required to comply with - the credit-worthiness based 
prevailingly on the mortgage consumer’s ability to repay the mortgage rather 
than the expected rising value of the property - should banish the spectre of 
casino banking for good. The possibility that the consumer will ‘go bust’ should 
be rendered remote as the prospective mortgagor is now discouraged from taking 
up a loan exceeding his financial capacities. Although in the long term the 
property market can be viewed as profitable, in the short and middle term the 
overburdened finances of the borrower may prove fatal and force him into a no 
win situation if he was not in a position to maintain payment of the instalments. 
A further benefit is for the same financial institutions and the expected principle 
of stability that they should comply with, also in order to mitigate systemic 
risks.99 In this respect, the MCD could indirectly prevent credit institutions from 
engaging in risky pursuits: among these, the too nonchalant and superficial 
granting of mortgages to a willing horde of property buyers. 
Actually, in better analysing the matter from this perspective, it can be affirmed 
that the MCD should have been even more persuasive. More in detail, as already 
                                                          
97 See, for instance, Italy. 
98 In this respect, the position of the British Government seems to be plausible. 
99 M Andenas and I H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation (Routledge, London and 
New York 2014). 
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alluded to under Section 2 above, art 5 of Directive 2014/17 could have more 
courageously required that the Member States, in cases where the national 
systems are based on a twin-peak supervision,100 the authorities empowered to 
enforce the principles of Directive 2014/17 should have been both, ergo that in 
charge of the conduct of the intermediaries, and the one dedicated to their 
stability. According to this line of reasoning, Britain, where the powers under 
Directive 2014/17 have been conferred on the FCA (the authority exclusively in 
charge of overseeing the protection of the consumer), is still vulnerable as 
regards the consequences of reckless lending and the residual impact on the 
stability of the financial institution. Although it is arduous to say that across the 
Channel this may engender in future an infringement of the MCD as regards the 
way it has been implemented, nevertheless a more prudent approach would have 
been to give a mandate to two supervisory authorities in this area. Conversely, 
Italy is the jurisdiction where the Bank of Italy supervises both the conduct of 
the financial institutions and their stability. In this country, the authority upon 
which the powers under Directive 2014/17 have been conferred is the Bank of 
Italy. Ergo, this country may represent an example of ideal implementation of 
the MCD or, better yet, of perfect transposition of the principles of this recent 
EU piece of legislation. 
Finally, from a purely private law perspective, Directive 2014/17 contains two 
remarkable novelties.  
On the one hand, a new precept is enshrined in the laconic art 28(4): the 
possibility for the lender, so long as this is agreed in advance, to take possession 
of the secured property in the case of default. This new principle, accepted in its 
entirety in common law jurisdictions, is a significant departure from the 
prohibition of the agreement of forfeiture, existing and entrenched in civil law 
jurisdictions.101 This derogation, further to the one already introduced under 
Directive 2002/47,102 may be an opportunity to secure an alignment of these legal 
systems to the more modern principles of circulation of the security.  
On the other hand, the MCD contains a ‘warning’ to the common law 
jurisdictions and their historical superficial acceptance of default charges. These 
conducts, so far tolerated under the common law but tackled with harshness 
under civil law jurisdictions, shall be unlawful, if these burdens exceeded the real 
cost that the bank is suffering. As highlighted under the previous Section 8, this 
power to detect the unlawfulness falls, seemingly, within the remit of the national 
courts, given the nature, clear and precise, of the new legal provision. 
                                                          
100 This is the case of Britain, where there is an authority in charge of the conduct of the intermediaries and a 
different one empowered to supervise the stability of the credit institution. 
101 Or, to cite the Italian jurisdiction, the patto commissorio. 
102 The so called ‘Collateralisation Directive’. For commentaries to this piece of legislation, see more recently M 
Haentjens and P de Gioia Carabellese, European Banking and Financial Law (Routledge, London and New York 
2015) 209-226. 
